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Abstract 
As much of the world pushes ahead with the deployment of renewable energy,             
resource-rich MENA economies are lagging behind. This paper contends that while the main             
obstacles to deployment of renewables are grid infrastructure inadequacy, insufficient          
institutional capacity, and risks and uncertainties, the investment incentives lie on a policy             
instrument spectrum with two polar solutions: (i) the incentive is provided entirely through             
the market (removing all forms of fossil fuel subsidies and internalising the cost of              
externalities); or (ii) the incentive is provided through a full government subsidy programme             
(in addition to the existing fossil fuel subsidies). However, there is a trade-off between the               
two dimensions of the fiscal burden and political acceptance across the policy instrument             
spectrum, which implies that the two polar solutions themselves are not easily and fully              
implementable in these countries. We propose a new dynamic combinatorial approach           
(partial subsidy programme and partial fossil fuel price adjustment) that gradually moves            
towards market-based incentive provision over the medium to long-term where energy           
subsidies are eventually phased out. The approach balances fiscal sustainability with           
political stability, enabling the gradual scaling up and development of markets for            
renewables. 
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Abbreviations 
ADWEC  Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company 
CfD  Contract for Difference 
CG  Captive Generation 
CREG  Commission de Régulation de l’Electricité et du Gaz 
CSP  Concentrating Solar Power 
D  Distribution 
ECRA  Electricity and Co-generation Regulatory Authority 
FiT  Feed in Tariff 
G  Generation 
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council 
GCCI  GCC interconnection 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GW  Gigawatt 
HVDC  High-Voltage, Direct Current 
ICC  International Chamber of Commerce 
IPP  Independent Power Producer 
ISO  Independent System Operator 
IWPP  Independent Power and Water Producer 
KACARE  King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
KAHRAMAA  Qatar General Water and Electricity Corporation 
kWh Kilowatt-hour 
LCOE  Levelised Cost of Energy 
Mcf  Million cubic feet 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
MMBtu  Million British thermal units 
MWh  Megawatt-hours 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PPAs  Power Purchase Agreements 
PV  Photo Voltaic 
SABIC  Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
SEC  Saudi Electricity Company 
SUNA  Renewable Energy Organisation of Iran 
T  Transmission 
T&D  Transmission and Distribution 
TGC  Tradable Green Certificates 
TSO  Transmission System Operator 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
USD  United States Dollars 
VIM  Vertically Integrated Monopoly 
WEC  Saudi Arabia Water and Electricity Company 
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 1. Introduction 
Countries in the MENA region are richly endowed with renewables – particularly solar and              
to some extent wind – with among the world’s best direct normal radiation levels              
(Griffiths, 2017). The GCC countries alone lie in the ‘global sunbelt’ – a region abundant               1
with solar radiation of more than 6 kWh/square metres per day – with 59% of their                
surface area suitable for solar deployment, and 56% for wind (IRENA, 2016; Alnaser and              
Alnaser, 2011). Despite this huge potential, renewable energy accounts for just 1% of             
total primary energy and 3.5% of electricity generation across the MENA. More than             
90% of renewables consists of hydroelectricity (IISD, 2014), whilst non-hydro renewables           
barely exceed 1% of total electricity generation (see Table 2).  
The literature on renewables deployment in the MENA region has hitherto primarily focused             
on net energy importing countries. The focus on renewables in resource-rich MENA            2
countries is comparatively recent, as their energy policies have been driven by their             
massive hydrocarbon endowments (representing 52% of global proved oil and 42% of            
gas reserves) and access to cheap (subsidised) energy. Consequently, literature on           
renewables deployment in MENA resource-rich countries is relatively sparse, and can be            
broadly grouped into three categories. First, the group that analyses the introduction of             
renewables into the energy mix through instruments that reduce the downside financial            
risks of renewables adoption to investors (Wustenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). Matar           
et al (2015) conclude that the use of investment credits (producer subsidies) alongside a              
1 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.  
2 Primarily driven by energy supply (import) security concerns, in addition to Green House Gas (GHG)                
mitigation (e.g. Morocco) (Carafa et al, 2014). 
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continuation of subsidised energy prices presents the optimal approach, whereas Trieb           
et al (2011) argue that long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) combined with            
investment guarantees provided by multilateral agencies provide the best financial          
de-risking approach for renewables. Some studies consider other risks, such as political            
and regulatory, but propose financial de-risking as a means to address these risks             
(Komendantova et al, 2011). These studies largely promote the use of government            
support (including explicit or implicit subsidies), but say little about the longer-term            
evolution of such an approach in these countries, especially given their large fiscal             
burden from existing fossil fuel subsidies (Abdmouleh et al, 2015). 
A second category of literature supports the need for an overarching policy framework to              
promote renewables deployment in resource-rich MENA countries. Al-Amir and         
Abu-Hijleh (2013) and Mezher et al (2012) suggest energy sector deregulation and the             
market provision of renewables as an end-goal, but fall short of specifying a policy path               
to best achieving this. Sgouridis et al (2016) map different renewable options by sector              
for the UAE showing that the benefits outweigh implementation costs, but acquiescing            
that an actionable plan is necessary to enable the transition from fossil fuels. A final               
category of techno-economic literature focuses on modelling these countries’ transitions          
to renewable energy using long-term optimisation. For instance, Mondal et al (2012)            
explore technology choices (including renewables) to meet future demand in the most            
cost efficient way.  
A review of existing literature exposes three gaps. First, existing studies focus on ‘what’              
should be done to promote renewables at any point in time, and less on developing an                
overarching, long-term, self-sustainable dynamic framework. Second, existing studies        
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fail to recognise the trade-off faced by resource-rich MENA countries between fiscal            
sustainability (the continued use of subsidies) and political stability (the continued           
provision of low priced energy which underpins the ‘social contract’ with their citizens             
due to political structure). And third, existing studies focus dominantly on individual            
country cases, with limited applicability to the wider region despite shared barriers to             
deployment. For instance Bhutto et al (2014) in a review of MENA renewables literature              
since 2005, find that only nine out of fifty-six peer-reviewed studies had a regional as               
opposed to country-specific focus, and that was limited to the GCC rather than MENA              
resource-rich countries as a whole. 
The motivation for this paper is fourfold. First, the Paris Climate agreement has accelerated              
policy measures towards hydrocarbon substitution and energy efficiency in the future           
centres of global energy demand growth (such as China and India). Most MENA             
countries are party to the agreement, and although they differ in their approaches, most              
have set out some plans to adopt renewables (Griffiths, 2017) (see Table 1). Second, in                3
addition to structural shifts on the demand-side, the entry of US shale producers into              
the international market has altered the dynamics of oil market equilibria, dampening            
prices and increasing competition for a potentially smaller market share. MENA           
countries that want to monetise their reserves and maximise export revenues before            
global demand for petroleum is affected, can do so by increasing the current share of               
renewables in their electricity sectors, freeing crude oil and natural gas for export (Trieb              
et al, 2011) . 4
3 In the GCC, IRENA (2016) estimates that by 2030, carbon emissions can be reduced by a cumulative total of                    
around 1 gigatonne (Gt), resulting in an 8% reduction in the region’s per capita carbon footprint. 
4 Crude oil, natural gas and oil products constitute almost 100% of fuel mix for power generation in                  
resource-rich MENA countries.  
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A third reason relates to rapidly rising domestic demand and energy security. Despite having              
substantial reserves, apart from Iran, Qatar, Algeria and to some extent Oman, in most              
countries of the region demand for gas has been growing faster than exploration and              
utilisation of new gas reserves . This has impacted the security of gas to power supply               5
chains in these countries (e.g. Kuwait and UAE are already net importers of gas). If the                
increase in electricity demand is not met with natural gas or renewbales, it will              
inevitably need to be met by oil or oil product plants, which have high opportunity costs                
in these countries. Finally, concerns over long-term fiscal stability (due to their            
hydrocarbon-based economies) have led policymakers to view renewables as an          
industry providing opportunities for economic diversification. This idea is underpinned           6
by rapidly falling costs of renewables in the MENA .  7
This paper investigates the following key questions: (i) what are the policy solutions for              
incentivising investment in renewables in these countries; and (ii) what are the barriers             
to the deployment of renewables? Through a systematic analysis we provide insights            
into the issues and options for renewables deployment in resource-rich MENA countries.            
We propose a combinatorial approach in which incentive for investment is provided            
partially through the market and partially through government subsidies. The          
combinatorial approach can be part of a dynamic process where governments start from             
the most feasible point on the proposed policy instrument spectrum and gradually move             
towards market-based incentive provision over the medium to long-term where energy           
5 Due to challenging extractive conditions, subsidised prices and unattractive investment terms (Griffiths,             
2017).  
6 IRENA (2016) estimates that the GCC could create an average of 140,000 jobs/year through renewables,                
although it is unclear which segments of the supply chain will generate these.  
7 Phase 2 of Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park was auctioned at 5.85 US cents/ kWh, amongst the                    
lowest in the world. Dubai’s DEWA reportedly received 5 bids from international firms to build the third phase                  
of the park, the lowest of which is 2.99 US cents/kWh (MEES, 2016b). 
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subsidies are eventually phased out. The dynamic combinatorial approach not only           
reduces fiscal pressure on government budgets (compared to a fully subsidised model),            
but also averts political risks by allowing businesses and households to slowly adapt to              
the new environment, where energy carriers are priced at their full economic costs.  
Section 2 of the paper discusses models of incentive provision for renewable investment             
and presents the combinatorial approach. Section 3 analyses the challenges of           
renewable deployment in the MENA hydrocarbon economies. Section 4 discusses the           
issue of power sector reform in these countries in light of renewable policies. Section 5               
concludes.  
Table 1: MENA Domestic Targets on Renewable Energy  
 Target Date 
Kuwait 15% of electricity demand (generation)  2030 
Saudi Arabia  9.5GW of renewable energy  
 
2023 
 
UAE 24% clean energy (including nuclear) in energy mix by 2021; Abu Dhabi-7% of 
capacity by 2020; Dubai-7% capacity by 2020 and 15% by 2030 (versus ‘Business 
As Usual’)  
2021
,  
2030 
Oman - - 
Qatar 1.8GW solar (16% of generation) by 2020; 10GW solar PV by 2030 2020
, 
2030  
Bahrain 5% of installed capacity  2020 
Iran 5GW wind and solar capacity  2020 
Morocco 42% of installed capacity by 2020; including 2GW solar & 2GW wind 2020 
Jordan  10% of generation  2020 
Egypt 20% of generation  2020 
Yemen 15% of generation  2025 
Algeria 20% of generation 2030 
Tunisia 25% of capacity 2030 
Source: IRENA (2013; 2016); Mittal (2016); IEA (2016) 
 
Table 2: Renewables (ex-Hydro) Electric Installed Capacity in MENA Countries 
 Wind 
 
MW 
Solar 
PV 
MW 
Solar 
CSP 
MW 
Other 
Renewables 
MW 
Total Renewables 
Installed Capacity 
Megawatts 
Renewables 
as% of Total 
Installed 
Capacity 
Total Installed 
Capacity 
Gigawatts 
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Algeria 10 7.1 25 0 42.1 0.24 17.24 
Bahrain 0.5 5 0 0 5.5 0.14 3.97 
Egypt 610 15 20 0 645 2.05 31.45 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 13.28 
Iran 135 34 0 6.8 175.8 0.00 70.03 
Jordan 1.45 13.6 0 3.5 18.55 0.52 3.56 
Kuwait 0 1.8 0 0 1.8 0.01 14.99 
Lebanon 0.5 1.6 0 0 2.1 0.08 2.50 
Libya 0 5 0 0 5 0.10 5.15 
Morocco 750 15 20 0 785 10.21 7.69 
Palestine 0.7 4 0 0.2 4.9 3.50 0.14 
Qatar 0 1.2 0 40 41.2 0.47 8.75 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 19 0 0 19 0.03 
61.87 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 2.26 
Syria  
8 0.15 2 0 0 2.15 0.04 4.80 
Tunisia 245 20 0 0 265 6.12 4.33 
UAE 0 33 100 1 134 0.46 28.96 
Yemen 0 3 0 0 3 0.35 0.85 
MENA 1,728 146 165 52 1,974 1.0 283 
Source: RCREE/AFEX (2015); MEES (2015); MOEM (2016); AOGD (2015); SHANA (2015) 
 
2. Incentivising renewable deployment 
Although governments of MENA hydrocarbon economies may have different objectives to           
achieve by deploying renewables, the solution always involves creating incentives and           
eliminating or lowering the barriers to investment. MENA governments have historically           
played a significant role in supplying energy, with the main energy companies under             
state-ownership. Therefore, the solution to the challenge of renewable deployment implicitly           
defines the role of the government. The nature of barriers in resource-rich countries are to               
some extent similar to other developing countries, but the options for investment incentives             
differ because of their dependency on oil/gas export revenues and huge domestic            
consumption of subsidised fossil fuels.  
Figure 1 presents a stylised framework for promoting renewables in the generation mix.             
Governments need to design appropriate policies to tackle deployment barriers in the areas of              
8 Limited data availability. 
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grid connection and management, institutional challenges and risk and uncertainties.          
Governments must simultaneously design policies that create investment incentives. There          
are two extreme policy solutions to incentivise renewable investment in resource-rich           
countries. In one approach, the government introduces a full renewable subsidy programme            
(alongside existing fossil fuel subsidies) and steers investment towards specific renewables.           
This requires long-term government support and commitment in order to create investor            
confidence. In the other case, the government eliminates barriers and lets economics            
determine market outcomes with respect to the quantity and type of renewable technologies             
installed. This requires the complete removal of fossil fuel subsidies (and internalising the             
cost of externalities) so that renewable technologies that are already competitive can kick in.  
 
Figure 1: A stylised model of renewable enhancement 
[Source: Authors] 
However, both approaches are polar solutions on a policy instrument spectrum. More            
market-based approaches result in political challenges, whereas moving towards a fully           
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subsidised renewable programme increases economic pressures. Recent attempts at energy          
pricing reforms in the GCC countries illustrate these pressures. Therefore, there is a             9
fundamental trade-off between these two polar solutions in resource-rich MENA countries,           
implying that they are not implementable in their pure forms. Therefore, we argue that              
investment incentives for renewable deployment in these countries need to be provided            
through a combinatorial approach, which involves partial energy price reform and a partial             
subsidy programme. We discuss the two polar solutions below and highlight some of the              
main challenges of implementation in resource-rich MENA economies. We then present the            
combinatorial approach, which potentially avoids the challenges of two polar solutions and            
is more compatible with the economic and political context in these countries.  
2.1 Market-oriented approach 
As the first-best solution, the market-based model comprises a set of measures to promote              
efficiency and innovation in the energy sector through markets and competition (as            
opposed to government) and facilitate private sector participation. This approach,          
depending on the manner of implementation, can overcome economic barriers to           
renewables deployment and enhance the institutional and technical capacity of the country.            
In practice, the first-best solution involves steps such as the removal of fossil fuel subsidies               
and internalising the cost of externalities (i.e., putting a price on carbon emission) alongside              
addressing barriers in the areas of grid access, institutions and risk and uncertainties.  
Therefore, the success of the market-oriented approach depends, to a great extent, upon             
the price of fossil fuels. There is a (range of) price for oil (and gas) below which the market                   
9 ​For instance, in January 2015, in response to fiscal pressures from falling oil revenues, Kuwait’s government                 
increased diesel, kerosene, and aviation fuel prices. However, it faced political opposition and public protests,               
and eventually reinstated the old prices a few weeks after the announcement, for some users (Fattouh et al,                  
2016).  
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cannot incentivise investment in renewables on its own (i.e., without government           
intervention). This price depends on factors such as the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) for               
renewables, prospect for technological improvement and cost reduction of alternative          
resources, heat rate of fossil fuel generators and heat content of fossil fuels. The calculation               
of this price requires a detailed study for each oil and gas producing country of the region.                 
However, for illustrative purposes and to highlight its importance for the market            
liberalisation approach, we do a back-of-the-envelope calculation. According to EIA (2016),           
generating 1 MWh of electricity requires 1.73 barrels of oil or 10.11 Mcf of natural gas. On                 10
the other hand, IRENA (2016) estimates the LCOE for a utility scale solar PV in the Middle                 
East to be between $58-100/ MWh. Using the lowest LCOE for PV technology (i.e.,              11
$58/MWh) we conclude that oil needs to be at least at $34/bbl and gas needs to be a                  
minimum of $5.7/Mcf for the market to incentivise renewables deployment without any            
subsidy and government support. If the upper bound for levelised cost of solar is adopted,               12
the oil price should be at least $57/bbl and the natural gas price should be at least                 
$9.89/Mcf. The LCOE ignores the costs of integration, implying that if the cost of              
intermittency is taken into account, the prices of oil and gas need to be even higher. This                 
calculation is of course simplistic and sensitive to the aforementioned assumptions; it is             
sufficient to make the point that a pure market-based approach depends on the price of               
competing fuels.  
10 Assuming the heat rate of petroleum to be 10,156 Btu/kWh and natural gas to be 10,408 Btu/kWh. Fuel heat                    
content is assumed to be 1,029,000 Btu per 1,000 cubic feet (Mcf) for the Natural gas and 5,867,946 Btu per                    
Barrel (42 gallons) for Petroleum. 
11 The lowest estimate is based on the latest auction on the second phase of Mohammed bin Rashid 
Al Maktoum Solar Park which cleared at 5.85 US cents/ kWh but the highest estimate is based on project level                    
data and expert opinion (IRENA, 2016).  
12 Some have estimated the break-even price as low as $23/bbl for oil and $4/MMBtu for natural gas.                  
(http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/robin-mills-remarkable-solar-bids-in-dubai-should-spur-on-other
-gulf-nations) 
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2.1.1 Removing fossil fuel subsidies to enable markets 
Fossil fuel subsidies are often justified on the basis that they protect low-income consumers              
and improve the competitiveness of energy intensive industries. But they also constitute the             
main barriers to renewables deployment and market functioning as under-pricing of fossil            
fuels incentivises their consumption at the expense of renewables. In practice, subsidies            13
have created an ‘incumbent advantage’, slowing down not only renewables deployment but            
also learning rates and cost reductions.  
Coady et al (2015) estimates that pre-tax MENA energy subsidies (defined as the difference              
between consumer prices and the costs of supply) amounted to $154 Bn in 2015 (46% of                
global pre-tax energy subsidies) or 4.5% of combined MENA GDP. It further estimates that              
on the basis of post-tax energy subsidies (pre-tax subsidies plus an environmental tax and a               
consumption tax), petroleum, natural gas and coal account for the largest share (around 89%),              
whereas electricity subsidies account for 11%. Of the large resource-rich MENA countries,            14
Iran accounted for the highest level of subsidies measured by this metric, at 15% of GDP, and                 
Qatar for the lowest (1.64 %), with Saudi Arabia’s subsidies estimated at 9.3% of GDP.               15
MEES (2016d) estimates that in Kuwait, 70% of the total subsidy allocation of $11.9 Bn in                
2015 went to petroleum products (especially gasoline) and electricity (mainly in terms of fuel              
for power plants). With fossil fuel subsidies, it is not only harder for renewables to compete                
13 Criticisms of subsidies include: pressure on government budgets leading to budget cuts elsewhere, low cost                
recovery in electricity, adverse environmental impacts, and disproportionate amount of benefits for high             
income deciles. For instance, the poorest quintile in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen receives               
only about 1–7% of total diesel subsidies, while the richest quintile received subsidies of 42–77% of the total                  
(El-Katiri and Fattouh, 2015; Sdralevich et al., 2014). 
14 Each of these subsidies (petroleum, natural gas, coal and electricity) refers to the difference between the                 
cost of supply and the price of the product plus an assumed environmental tax and consumption tax (IMF,                  
2015). However, it must be noted that this is simply one estimate/measure of subsidies and may not be                  
entirely accurate. 
15 Saudi Arabia’s total energy subsidy bill in 2015 was $61Bn, including $23 Bn each for diesel and electricity,                   
and $9.5 for gasoline MEES (2016c).  
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with existing generation sources, but also for electricity to compete with fossil fuels in end               
markets, particularly transportation.   16
Fossil fuel subsides has led to a huge gap between the LCOE and retail electricity tariffs on a                  
per kilowatt-hour basis. Table 3 illustrates this, showing that at the estimated LCOE, solar is               
just about competitive in the UAE, but cannot compete with heavily subsidised fossil fuels in               
many other MENA countries at the estimated retail tariffs . Filling this gap with fossil fuel               17
price reform ​would be challenging for a host of economic and political reasons. First,              
significant energy price rise can result in a supply-side shock to the economy, negatively              
affecting the competitiveness of energy intensive industries. Other industries will be           
indirectly affected because of a rise in the general level of prices. For example, following the                
announcement of energy price reform in Saudi Arabia, a number of listed companies             
announced that their cost structures would be impacted – the petrochemical giant SABIC             
reported a 5 % annual increase in its cost structure (Fattouh et al, 2016). Likewise, the                
demand side may respond with a sudden drop in consumption, and may or may not recover.                
Therefore, large energy price increases can lead to inflation, and potential economic            
slowdown.  
Table 3: Renewables LCOE versus retail tariffs in resource-rich MENA countries 
 LCOE for recent projects  Retail tariffs  (US Cents/kWh) 
18
Location Technology LCOE (US 
Cents/kWh) 
 Residential 
 
Industrial Commercial 
16 Due to the lack of transparent data, it is difficult to differentiate accurately between fossil fuel subsidies and 
electricity subsidies. 
17 In Iran, which has started reforming energy prices, the retail tariff is well below costs of production across                   
most ranges of consumption. Additionally, the depreciation of the Iranian Rial has meant that price reform in                 
practice did not lead to a major adjustment of real energy prices, given the opportunity cost of using fossil                   
fuels in power generation.  
18 The industrial tariff in Iran excludes water and agriculture. Also, industrial and commercial tariffs are 
categorised based on maximum contracted capacity (differs based on being lower or higher than 30 kW). 
Residential tariff is an inclined block tariff and along with commercial tariff differs for cold and hot regions of 
the country (lower in hotter regions). Exchange rate used for conversion is 1 USD=30550 Iranian Rials.  
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UAE Solar PV 5.85 Saudi 
Arabia 
1.3 3.2 4.1 
Jordan Solar PV 6.1-7.7 Iran 0.4-9.6 0.6-4.3 2.6-10.7 
Egypt Onshore 
Wind 
4.1-5.0 Kuwait 0.7 0.7 0.4 
   UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 
5.6-8.7 4.2 4.2-8.0 
   UAE 
(Dubai) 
7.8-12.1 7.8-12.1 7.8-12.1 
   Qatar 2.2-6.0 2.5-4.9 2.2 
   Bahrain 0.8 0.8 3.8 
   Oman 2.6 5.2 4.2 
Source: IRENA (2016); IEA (2015); MoE (2015) 
 
Furthermore, energy price reform is a politically sensitive issue in the MENA’s resource-rich             
monarchies. Measures perceived as disruptive to the established structure of political           
institutions potentially risk social discontent. The implicit social contract between rulers and            
citizens of these countries endows governments with the privilege of governing           
hydrocarbon resources in exchange for the redistribution of resource rents (Fattouh et al,             
2016). The complete removal of fossil fuel subsidies, which in the short run takes away               
wealth from consumers, may be perceived as the breakdown of the implicit social contract,              
and could face social opposition if mitigating measures are not taken. Gradual energy pricing              
reform accompanied by clear communication to the public and balanced by compensatory            
measures for lower-income consumers and mitigation measures for the private sector,           
could sustain a more ‘elastic’ social contract (Fattouh et al, 2016).  
2.1.2 Pricing carbon (internalising externalities) 
A carbon tax can provide market-oriented incentives for deploying renewables, specifically           
when energy price reform alone cannot provide the incentives needed. The carbon tax is a               
direct tax on burning fossil fuels (e.g. in power generation) and thus internalises the cost of                
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externalities. In economics, it is the most effective way to incentivise renewable energy             
because it relies on the free market to choose the most efficient clean energy innovations               
and investments. However, a carbon tax adversely impacts the economy in the short run              
and hurts low-income consumers. One solution would be to redistribute carbon tax            
revenues to alleviate electricity bills and reduce other taxes (e.g. income tax and capital              
gains tax).   19
However, the problem of taxation in the MENA resource rentier economies goes beyond             
these distributional and economics challenges. First, these countries lack an established tax            
collection system and relevant institutions. For example, in the GCC, tax revenues (primarily             
from corporate, trade and property taxes) comprise a tiny fraction of government revenues.            
Additionally, taxation is a politically sensitive issue everywhere, but more so in             20
resource-rich countries because introducing new taxes undermines a government’s source          
of legitimacy and public support obtained through the distribution of resource rents.            
Therefore, under prevailing conditions, a carbon tax policy is unlikely to be implemented in              
these countries - something which even developed economies with a long tradition of             
taxation struggle to establish.  
2.2 Fully subsidised renewable energy programme 
In contrast with the market-based approach, a fully subsidised renewable programme can            
incentivise investment by offering direct and indirect financial incentives. This approach           
requires the heavy involvement of government in the process of renewables deployment,            
from designing to implementation and management of support schemes. There is a wide             
19 This is sometimes referred to as a revenue-neutral carbon tax, such as the one introduced in British                  
Columbia, Canada. 
20 Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP in the GCC is as follows: Oman (2.8%), UAE (2.5%), Qatar (1.7%),                     
Saudi Arabia (1.4%), Kuwait (0.8%) and Bahrain (0.6%) (Fattouh et al., 2016). 
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range of schemes that governments can select from, some of which can be implemented in               
non-liberalised electricity sector structures, and alongside fossil fuel subsidies. Overall,          
renewable policy support policies can be broadly classified into production-based and           
investment-based schemes (see Figure 2). These can be further divided into price-based and             
quantity-based models. Definition of various models of support schemes is provided in Table             
4.  
 
Figure 2: Classification of renewable support schemes 
[Source: Authors] 
Table 4: definition of support schemes 
Type of scheme Definition 
Feed-in-tariff Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) is a long-term contract (e.g., 15 years) between the 
off-taker (usually government) and the producer of renewable electricity 
in which a guaranteed payment is made for each unit of energy fed into 
the grid.  
17 
 
 
Feed-in-premiu
m 
Feed-in-premium is a scheme in which the owner of renewable 
generation receives a payment on top of what he normally receives from 
the sale of his energy in the electricity market. The premium can be 
fixed, floating or can have a cap and floor. 
Net metering  at 
retail tariff 
Net metering is a policy whereby the net consumption of user (which can 
be positive or negative) is tracked through a bi-directional meter. The 
consumer pays a retail electricity tariff when the net consumption is 
positive during the billing period. On the other hand, when the net 
consumption is negative, the consumer is compensated at retail tariff (or 
wholesale price). Alternatively, end-user can bank the surplus energy 
credit for the following period. 
 
Tradable green 
certificates 
A tradable green certificate (TGC) entitles renewable generator to the 
revenue from TGCs on top of the revenue from the sale of their energy in 
the electricity market. TGC is issued for each unit of energy by 
renewables (e.g., MWh). The electricity suppliers are required to 
surrender a sufficient number of TGCs in order to comply with their 
obligations. A penalty is imposed (per MWh) on suppliers in the event 
they fail to submit the required certificates which, in practice, acts as a 
cap for TGC prices.  
Tendering 
(production or 
investment) 
In the tendering model, the government specifies the quantity of 
renewable energy that needs to be procured and runs an auction in 
order to discover the price (per MWh or MW) and grant contracts to the 
most efficient suppliers. 
Tax credit 
(production or 
investment) 
In a production tax credit, renewable facility is partially or totally 
exempted from tax liabilities during a specific year based on the amount 
of energy produced.  Investment tax credit on other hand provides tax 
exemption based on the amount of capital expenditures on the 
renewable energy technologies.  
Tax reduction 
(production and 
investment)  
Tax reduction is a cut in tax based on the energy produced or capital 
expenditure and can include sales, value added, carbon or energy taxes.  
Preferential 
loans 
In preferential loans governments cover part of the interest rate (e.g., 
50%) for the finance provided by financial institution to renewable 
energy technologies. If the perceived project risk is high, the government 
may provide a guarantee to cover a share of the outstanding loan 
principal in order to lower the capital cost to investors.  
Grants It is a fund given by government to cover part of the capital expenditure 
of renewable facility.  
 
Source: authors 
Although from an economic perspective, renewable support schemes imply further          
distortion to the electricity market, this approach is more likely to achieve a particular              
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renewable target. Additionally, it can be used to achieve objectives beyond renewable            
deployment such as job creation and growth of domestic industry. For instance, in order to               
incentivise the use of domestically manufactured products, equipment and technologies,          
Iran applies a 15 % increase to the standard rate of power purchase agreements of locally                
sourced renewable plants. Similarly, KACARE (King Abdullah City for Atomic and           21
Renewable Energy) incorporates local content stipulations in competitive procurement         
including a fiscal incentive for local employment.  
The type of schemes that can be adopted by resource-rich economies depends on a number               
of factors including the project scale, degree of maturity of renewable technology, size of              
renewable targets, financial/fiscal constraints, risk attitude, presence of relevant institutions          
and stage of electricity market liberalisation. For example, schemes such as production tax             
or investment tax incentives are unsuitable for small-scale projects such as rooftop solar PV,              
because households may not have tax liabilities to offset. For immature technologies or             
those at a demonstration stage, investment-based schemes are more suitable than           
production-based schemes. However, investment-based schemes are unsuitable for        
countries facing fiscal constraints because of the lump sum payments needed. For risk             
averse investors, a feed-in-tariff with full cost coverage is an effective approach, as opposed              
to a feed-in-premium in which subsidies partially cover the project’s cost and investors need              
to rely in part on volatile electricity market prices. Furthermore, feed-in-tariffs have proved             
to be more successful in promoting scalability and realising ambitious renewable targets.            
Nonetheless, this model treats both efficient and inefficient projects similarly thus can            
become costly over time.  
21 http://www.wfw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/WFW-Briefing-Renewable-Energy-in-Iran.pdf 
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Some support schemes require the existence of specific institutions: for example, a            
tax-based incentive is ineffective in countries that lack strong tax institutions/systems (i.e.            
MENA). Further, schemes such as feed-in-premiums and TGCs under quota obligations           
require a liberalised electricity market in which there are many buyers and sellers, whereas              
others such as feed-in-tariffs can be implemented even under a monopoly market structure.  
Support schemes also differ in their degree of price exposure (i.e., market risk- when it is                
applied in a liberalised platform), and can be technology-specific or technology-neutral. In            
order to take advantage of the best features of different support models, schemes can be               
combined. For instance, feed-in-tariffs can be combined with tendering to ensure efficiency,            
or with tendering and contract for difference (CfD) in order to take advantage of electricity               
price movements. The UK has adopted the latter to support renewable development as part              
of its recent electricity market reform. Subsidy schemes can also be distinguished based on              
whether they focus on incentivising the supply side (e.g., feed-in-tariff) or the demand side              
(e.g., quota obligation). Consequently, governments need to make a decision about           
adopting appropriate forms of renewable support schemes.  
An effective renewable support policy scheme for resource-rich MENA countries is one            
which:  
▪ is compatible with the structure of electricity markets in the region 
▪ promotes scalability and covers most risks that investors are exposed to 
▪ can also be implemented in a low oil price environment (suitable for            
fiscally-constrained countries)  
▪ the relevant institutions exist and  
▪ is market-oriented to the extent possible  
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Matching above criteria to the existing economic and institutional context of resource rich             
countries, the following propositions can be derived. These statements are key to the             
understanding of the checklist analysis presented in Table 5.  
(i) A scheme is not compatible with current electricity market structure in the             
region if a renewable generator’s revenue partially dependent on the wholesale           
market. 
(ii) Suitability of scheme for large-scale projects depends on the extent to which the              
support scheme is market oriented.  
(iii) A support scheme is market oriented if the price is discovered in either a              
decentralised market or a centralised market (for example auction).  
(iv) Full cost coverage happens when the level of support is at least equal to levelised               
cost of energy (LCOE) over the lifetime of the project.  
(v) A support model is suitable for financially constraint country if it does not require              
a lump sum payment; the payment rather is distributed over the lifetime of             
asset. 
(vi) A scheme is compatible with current institution in the MENA countries if it does               
not require a specific taxing system or a liberalised market structure. 
As it is shown in Table 5, apart from (production-based) tendering, none of the schemes               
meets all of the aforementioned criteria. In terms of economics, auctions are the most              
efficient method of resource allocation if a sufficient number of non-colluding bidders            
participate. Currently, tendering is widely adopted for utility scale renewable investment in            
the region (see Table 6). The next best approaches are feed-in-tariff, preferential loans and              
grants. Feed in tariff is employed both for small and large projects and similar to grants and                 
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loans its implementation does not have the complexity of auction process. The remaining             
models are either not adopted or less popular in the region apart from the net metering. 
Net metering based on retail tariffs, which was popular in the USA, does not require a                
liberalised electricity market but needs undistorted retail electricity prices and a suitable            
retail tariff structure (e.g., a two-part tariff). This is because when retail tariff are volumetric,               
net metering can lead to bankruptcy of network utilities who cannot recover their fixed              
costs (self-generation reduces the metered consumption of users without a proportional           
change in their level of grid access). It also raises the electricity bill of low-income               
consumers who cannot afford self-generation. Nonetheless, the UAE has already adopted           
this approach (see Table 6)  but others such Saudi Arabia also considering it.  
Table 5: Evaluation of suitability of support schemes for resource rich countries of MENA 
Type of scheme Compatible 
with a 
non-liberali
sed 
electricity 
market? 
Suitable for 
large-scale 
projects? 
Full cost 
coverage 
for the 
project? 
Suitable for 
financially 
constrained 
countries? 
Relevant 
institutions 
exist? 
Market 
oriented? 
Feed-in-tariff ✓ 
 
✕ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✕ 
 
Feed-in-premium ✕ 
 
✓  ✕ 
 
✓ ✕ 
 
✓ 
Net metering  at 
retail tariff 
✓ 
 
✕ 
 
✕ 
 
✓ ✓  ✕  
Tradable green 
certificates 
✕ 
 
✓  ✕ 
 
✓ ✕ 
 
✓ 
Tendering 
(production) 
✓ 
 
✓  ✓ 
 
✓ ✓  ✓ 
Tendering 
(investment) 
✓  ✓  ✓ 
 
✕ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
Tax credit 
(production and 
investment) 
✓ ✓  ✕ 
 
✓ ✕ 
 
✕ 
 
Tax reduction 
(production and 
investment)  
✓  ✓  ✕ 
 
✓  ✕ 
 
✕ 
 
Preferential loans ✓ 
 
✓  ✕ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ 
 
Grants ✓ 
 
✓  ✕ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✕ 
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 [Source: Authors] 
Table 6: Renewable support policy schemes currently adopted in the MENA 
Country Support Policy  Further financial information 
Kuwait Competitive tenders; public 
investment, loans or grants 
N/A 
Saudi Arabia Competitive tenders; public 
investment, loans or grants 
N/A 
UAE Public investment, loans, 
grants, competitive tenders, 
net metering 
Over $700 million allocated since 2013.  
Oman Fiscal incentives; public 
competitive bidding; public 
investments, loans, or grants 
N/A 
Qatar Public investments, loans or 
grants 
N/A.  
Bahrain  - N/A 
Iran FiTs, capital subsidies, soft 
loans 
The base rate for FiT of maximum 5 years is at 4628 
Rials/kWh (Cost of production and transition to 20KV 
station) and 4480 Rials/kWh (only electricity production). 
 
Morocco  Competitive tenders; public 
investments, loans or grants 
In 2012 auction opened for 850 MW of wind capacity. 
Average auctioned price was USD 25-30/MWh 
 
Jordan FiTs, net metering; tax 
incentives; competitive 
tenders; public investments, 
loans, or grants 
The ceiling tariff is set at: 85, 135, 120, 90 and 60 
fils/kWh for wind, solar thermal, PV, biomass and biogas 
respectively. If a fully Jordanian origin facility is installed 
the tariff can be increased by 15%. 
 
Egypt FiTs, competitive tenders Feed-in tariff for PV systems ranges from 84.8 Pt/kWh 
for less than 200 kW to 102.5 (or equivalent of USD cent 
14.34) for 20 MW – 50 MW. Feed-in tariff prices for 
wind projects from 82.08 Pt/kWh  (11.48 USDcent/kWh) 
for 2500 operational hours to  32.90 Pt/kWh (4.60 
USDcent/kWh) for 4000 operational hours. 
 
Yemen Competitive bidding N/A 
 
Algeria FiTs; competitive bidding Feed in tariff range for solar PV installations from 20.08 
DZD/kWh ($255/MWh) (1 MW – 5 MW) and 16.06 
DZD/kWh ($204/MWh) (> 5 MW)  for 1275-1349 
operational hours to 11.80​ ​DZD/kWh ($150/MWh) (1 
MW – 5 MW) and 9.44​ ​DZD/kWh ($120/MWh) (> 5 
MW) for  ≥1725 operational hours.  
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Tunisia Net metering; fiscal 
incentives; public investments, 
grants or loans 
In 2009, the annual average price was DTN 92 
millimes/kWh for renewable energy sourced electricity 
and DTN 72 millimes/kWh for electricity from 
co-generation. 
[Source: IRENA (2013; 2016), IEA (2018)] 
 
2.2.1 Long term government support and commitment  
The government needs to reassure investors of its commitment and demonstrate that            
support for renewables is not ‘just for show’ but an integral part of an overall strategy for                 
energy and economic development. This can be done by, for example, integrating            
renewables within national energy strategies and utilising the many positive externalities           
created by renewables. It also requires measures such as introduction of dedicated financial             
support mechanisms. Priority sector lending, convertible loans and grants and guidelines for            
issuing green bonds are among many examples of financial support commitment. The            
government can also provide support such as technical assistance and grant funding for             
feasibility studies and document preparation to increase the pipeline of projects ready for             
investments (IRENA, 2016b). 
One important lesson from Europe’s experience is that frequent changes in renewables            
subsidy policy sends the wrong signals to private investors. For example, at the time of               
writing, the UK Low Carbon Contracts Company terminated the Contract for Difference            
feed-in-tariff that had been awarded to Mainstream Renewable Energy’s Neart Na Gaoithe            
offshore wind farm in 2015. This unprecedented action was followed by the            22
announcement that the Danish government may cancel a competitive auction planned for a             
series of nearshore wind farms. These measures have left offshore project developers on             
22   http://www.offshorewind.biz/2016/05/12/mainstream-disputes-neart-na-gaoithe-cfd-termination/ 
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the hook for millions of Euros in upfront development capital. These types of policy ‘U-turns’               
would be detrimental, specifically in the nascent markets of resource-rich MENA economies.            
In Egypt, for instance, the government changed regulations on international arbitration for            
renewables projects in May 2016, leading to considerable investor uncertainty.          23
Unpredictable changes therefore need to be avoided, and a mechanism for change set out              
within the policy itself to avoid surprising market players. Moreover, investors need to have              
enforceable contracts and a mutually agreed dispute resolution method specified in the            
terms of contract (for example through the international chamber of commerce (ICC)).  
The cost of support schemes could potentially compromise government commitment and           
long-term support, as subsidising renewables is expensive and pressurises already tight           
government budgets in a low oil price environment, given current fossil fuel subsidies which              
constitute a significant part of governments’ expenditures. Following the 2014 oil price fall,             
many oil producing MENA countries ran into budget deficits, and embarked on expenditure             
cuts in various economy sectors, alongside the suspension of some planned infrastructure            
projects. Figure 3 shows that the major resource-rich MENA countries have high gross debt              
and/or negative fiscal balances (as percentages of GDP). Although fiscal buffers are plentiful,             
they are temporary in the event of a prolonged decline in oil prices (Fattouh et al, 2016). 
Therefore, given ambitious renewable targets, along with exorbitantly high cost of fossil fuel             
subsidies in MENA countries, a full renewable subsidy programme is unlikely especially in             
the unfavourable economic conditions due to the oil price decline.  
23 ‘Egypt’s solar power upset clouds outlook for foreign investors’, ​The Indian Express​, 5 August 2016. 
http://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/egypts-solar-power-upset-clouds-outlook-for-foreign-inve
stors-2955324/  
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 Figure 3: fiscal balances and gross debt (% of GDP), 2015 
[Source: IMF (2016)] 
2.3 A combinatorial approach 
A long-term fully subsidised renewable energy programme, added to existing fossil fuel            
subsidies, is fiscally difficult across all resource-rich MENA economies. Similarly, the           
implementation of full energy price reform to enable the market, in a short time period,               
would be nothing short of a revolution. Therefore, the application of polar solutions in their               
pure forms would be extremely challenging, if not impossible. 
Any in-between strategy constitutes a combinatorial approach that takes some elements           
from the two polar solutions and depending on where it lies in the policy spectrum, the                
weight of one set of instruments (for example, market-based) can be higher or lower than               
other instruments (direct renewable subsidies) (Figure 4). In the early stages of introduction             
of renewables, it is likely that subsidies are the main means of incentivising investment in               
alternative energy (i.e., renewable support subsidies outweigh other policy instruments at           
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initial stages). Over time, two effects will likely change this: one is that the cost of                
renewables is continuously falling and the other is that many of resource rich countries of               
MENA are keen to do away with fossil fuel subsidies. Figure 5 shows that since 2010 the                 
costs of most renewables especially solar and wind has been falling dramatically. In some              
countries, solar and wind are already competitive with fossil fuels (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 4: Policy instrument spectrum for incentivising renewable investment 
[Source: Authors] 
 
Figure 5: Levelised cost of energy (LCOE) for renewables 2010-2016 
27 
 
Source: IRENA (2018) 
The combinatorial approach can be part of a dynamic process in which countries start from               
the most feasible point on the policy instrument spectrum, given their current context, and              
gradually move towards phasing out fossil fuel subsidies over the medium to long term. This               
not only reduces fiscal pressure on government budgets (compared to a fully subsidised             
model), but also averts political risks by allowing businesses and households to slowly adapt              
to the new environment where energy carriers are priced at their full economic costs. The               
position on the policy instrument spectrum is a function of the countries’ institutional             
setting, status of energy price reform, fiscal situation and public acceptance, among others.  
Given the pre-existing fossil fuel subsidies in the region, most hydrocarbon economies of             
MENA lie on the left hand side of the spectrum currently. The change in the weights of                 
instrument specifically removing fossil fuel subsides needs to be done in a careful and              
gradual manner due to its side effects. First, price reforms needs to be part of a                
comprehensive strategy that not only concerns with removing subsides but also is aware of              
its side effects (impact on low-income households and on the wider economy) and timing              
and speed of implementation. The pace and scope of reforms need to be adjusted according               
to the countries’ administrative and institutional capacities (IMF, 2017). Second,          
compensatory measures are required to mitigate the side effects after removal of fossil fuel              
subsides. Third, fossil fuel price reforms need to be accepted by public and this signifies the                
importance of communication and transparency. An automatic price adjustment approach          
in which price gap (the amount of subsidies provided by government for fossil fuels) is               
reduced at each period by a pre-determined percentage can be effective.  
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The combinatorial approach is compatible with current energy price reform policies in the             
resource-rich MENA economies. In fact, the fiscal tightening from the prolonged 2014            
downturn in oil prices has already led to widespread planned energy price reforms, alongside              
expenditure cuts (see Fattouh et al., 2016). The UAE was the first to announce              
comprehensive fuel subsidy cuts in mid-2015, by linking domestic prices for gasoline and             
diesel to international spot market prices. Saudi Arabia hiked fuel prices for transport, power              
generation fuels and petrochemicals feedstock, followed by hikes for electricity and water, in             
early 2016. Oman, Bahrain and Qatar all announced fuel price hikes in a flurry (MEES,               
2016d). Iran carried out fuel subsidy reform much earlier, in 2010, but underestimated its              
costs and the impact on consumer price inflation (Lilliestam and Patt, 2015). Price hikes were               
carried out in a very short period of time leading to increases of up to 150 % in some                   
countries, generating backlash from consumers. Consequently, some countries began         
rethinking the manner of reforms, instead opting for periodic (monthly) adjustments (Qatar,            
Oman) and targeting of poorer consumers (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) through considering price            
differentiation by consumption volumes, and rationing of quantities rather than providing           
price subsidies. Iran’s 2016 budget envisaged a reduction in the number of consumers             
receiving cash handouts and the revival of a fuel ‘smartcard’ scheme for selling gasoline at               
different consumption slabs (MEES, 2016e; 2016f; 2016g). Kuwait was the last MENA            
country to announce subsidy reforms, announcing a plan for an 83 % rise in some petrol                
prices – the first rise in 50 years - from 1 September 2016.  24
An important feature of the combinatorial approach is that it takes not only the economic               
factors but also political issues related to subsidies into account. Thus, the pace of price               
24 ‘Kuwait announces ‘ultra’ petrol price rise of 83% - to 55 cents a litre’ ​The Guardian​, 2 August 2016.                    
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/02/kuwait-announces-petrol-price-hike-of-83-to-55-cents-a-li
tre  
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reform can be adjusted for each individual resource-rich country based on its own context. As               
opposed to a fully subsidised programme which transfers the whole cost of renewable             
deployment to the government budget, the combinatorial approach partially relies on           
government and partially on the market. In a similar way, contrary to a fully market-based               
model which transfers the political risks to government but economic risk to market agents,              
the combinatorial approach distributes the risk between market players, government and           
consumers. The combinatorial approach provides a practical way forward for the           
hydrocarbon economies to increase the share of renewables in their power generation mix.  
 
3. Removing barriers to renewable deployment 
Creating investment incentives through the combinatorial approach, is necessary but not           
sufficient for renewable promotion as the barriers to deployment also need to be removed.              
Despite differences among MENA resource-rich countries, they share similarities in their           
energy sector structure and governance; hence, common factors contribute to the low            
levels of renewable investment in these economies. We identify these barriers to be: grid              
connection and management, institutional challenges and risk and uncertainties.  
3.1 Grid connection and management  
A key component of energy transformation in the MENA is the availability of grid              
infrastructure that enables reliable electricity transmission from production to consumption          
areas. In the absence of adequate grid capacity and resiliency, renewable energies may face              
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frequent curtailment due to network and reliability constraints. Grid inadequacy is a            
challenge for renewables deployment even in OECD countries such as the UK . 25
Furthermore, the connection cost model is important for renewable investment (shallow           
versus deep connection fees) –i.e., whether the grid company is responsible for the costs of               
grid connection and reinforcement, or the renewable project developer, and, if grid            
connection involves some costs then whether the investor can recover these through tariffs.             
Since renewable projects are more dependent on geographical location than conventional           
generation, many jurisdictions around of the world charge shallow connection charges           
meaning that renewable developer is only responsible for the cost of connection to the              
nearest grid point and cost of grid reinforcement is socialised among network users. Such an               
approach ensures that constraints relating to site selection are minimised. However, with            
the increase in the penetration of renewables, the amount of socialised costs will rise under               
shallow connection charge model and this can be problematic. 
Additionally, renewables investors need guaranteed access to the transmission/distribution         
grid under clear, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions. Given the electricity          
market structure in the MENA region and the form of renewable subsidies, priority access              
and priority dispatch may be necessary in engendering the competitiveness of renewables.            26
Over time as market structure evolves and subsidies become market based, propriety dispatch             
can be removed to allow for a level playing filed for all resources. ​The implication of priority                 
dispatch is that conventional generators have to reduce their generation levels in cases of              
25 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/10/uk-electricity-grid-renewable-energy-solar-trade-associ
ation. 
26 In the fully liberalised electricity markets in which the payment to renewable generators is linked to the                  
wholesale market, priority dispatch is not needed as renewable resources have natural priority because of               
their low marginal cost.  
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over-generation and/or transmission congestion ​(RCREEE/AFEX, 2015). In a competitive         
electricity market, curtailment (if needed) can be done in an economic way: generators can              
bid for the amount they are willing to receive in order to reduce their production.  
Priority access ensures that renewable generators are able to sell and transmit their electricity              
according to the connection rules at all times, whenever the source becomes available.             
Therefore, in a competitive market, it allows for the maximum use of installations connected              
to the grid. 
Transparency of regulation on grid access for renewables is specifically important for MENA             
countries because of the relatively integrated power sector structure in the region. ​In a              
highly integrated market, where the same actor handles both generation and transmission,            
incentives might arise to exclude generating competitors by denying grid access.  
One approach to address this issue is to specify grid access details in national-level              
regulations and grid codes, and to avoid case-by-case negotiations. Only a few MENA             
countries have specified grid access details in their regulations, and Algeria and Jordan             
include the most preferential grid access conditions for renewable projects (see Table 7).             
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi have detailed grid codes but do not specify any special               
conditions for renewable projects (RCREEE/AFEX, 2015).  
Furthermore, grid requires sufficient capacity and resiliency in order to withstand uptake of             
intermittent resources and this will not be achieved without significant investment. Grid            
investment, on the other hands, requires a suitable and stable regulatory and policy             
environment with appropriate incentives and long-term horizons. The inadequacy of          
domestic grid infrastructure can hinder penetration of renewables.  
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In addition to domestic infrastructure, countries also need to increase their regional            
interconnections to improve their balancing capability, flexibility and security of supply. The            
GCC interconnection (GCCI) grid links Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the             
UAE. ​More than 10 contracts worth over 1 Bn US$ were awarded in the first phase linking                 
Saudi Arabia with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Another initiative, the Seven Countries            
Interconnection Project launched in the 1990s aims to interconnect the grids of Libya, Egypt,              
Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon. Within the region, an HVDC (high-voltage, direct             
current) line is planned between Saudi and Egypt. However, electricity transfers among            
GCCI grid users have reportedly been small-scale and mainly during times of outages. An              27
important reason for the lack of electricity trade is the prevailing view of the interconnector               
as a backup rather than an opportunity for optimisation of the electricity system. The              28
penetration of renewables is expected to provide new opportunities for regional cooperation            
and trade in this regard. However, m​ajor efforts are required towards building trust for this               
sort of cooperation, as well as adding necessary infrastructure or reinforcing the grid where              
needed.   29
 
Table 7: Grid Access for Renewables in Selected MENA Countries, 2015 
    Technical Guidelines Adopted to 
Connect: 
 Guaranteed 
grid access  
Priority 
access 
Priority 
dispatch 
Small 
scale PV 
systems to 
low 
Utility 
scale PV  
systems to  
medium 
Wind 
parks to  
medium 
27 Oman’s state electricity and water firm wants to prioritise the development of a spot market by 2019, with                   
trials of electricity trading through the GCCI grid in 2016. 
28 While the GCC interconnection facilitates the infrastructure for electricity trade and cooperation among the               
six countries, it has mainly been utilised for emergency transfers of electricity to meet peak loads or to shore                   
up lost capacity from plant outages to help avert partial blackouts (KAPSARC, 2016).  
29 For instance, the Saudi electricity sector needs $133Bn of investments in generation, transmission and               
distribution (MEES, 2016h).  
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voltage 
grid 
and HV  
grid 
and HV  
grid 
Saudi 
Arabia 
No No No No No No 
Kuwait No No No No No No 
UAE No No No No No No 
Qatar No No No No No No 
Algeria Executive 
decree 06-428 
(2006), 
06-429 
(2006), and 
order of 2008 
No  Yes, once a 
renewable 
energy 
system is 
connected 
No Under 
preparation 
Under 
preparation 
Oman No No No Yes n/a n/a 
Bahrain No No No No No No 
Jordan Non-discrimin
atory 
guaranteed 
access 
foreseen by  
Law No. 13   
(2012) on  
Renewable 
Energy and  
Energy 
Efficiency, 
Article 8C 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Iran* Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes Yes 
[Source: ​(RCREEE/AFEX, 2015) * SUNA (2013)] 
3.2 Institutional challenges 
The successful implementation of renewable policy requires necessary institutional capacity,          
including administrative, economic and political. The type of institutions required depends           
on the specific policy and its complexity, as this indicates the degree to which a policy                
instrument is considered as legitimate, acceptable (commitment and long-term support          
from government and public) and can be adopted. At the same time, the enhancement of               
institutional capacity must not lead to excessive administrative and regulatory burdens as            
they themselves can become impediments to renewable deployment. For example, if           
obtaining relevant permits becomes complex and lengthy it increases transaction cost and            
34 
 
discourages investors from entering into renewable sector. Effective institutions need to           
reduce the administrative burden of procurement, selection of contract holders, granting           
contracts, site selection, construction and environmental permits and grid access to the            
minimum. While dedicated renewable energy agencies or departments are necessary to           
enable coordination amongst stakeholders, independent regulators are critical to ensuring          
transparency and engendering stability in the implementation of policies. 
Studies suggest that the MENA countries’ institutional feasibility should include the           
existence of renewable energy ministries and regulators, their resources, competencies,          
laws, existing strategies and activities in renewable energy (DIE, 2012). As Table 8 shows for               
selected resource-rich (and non-resource-rich) MENA countries, most countries have a          
dedicated renewable policy agency. However, current institutional frameworks for energy in           
the MENA countries are largely dominated by the oil and gas sector and renewables have               
yet to be integrated within these. The implication of this is that oil/gas sector has a strong                 
influence over the future development of electricity sector. Currently, the MENA countries’            
power sectors consist of mainly large powerful state-owned companies overseeing          30
generation, purchase and supply of power based on traditional business models which can             
be disrupted by renewables deployment. In the absence of regulations that strengthen the             
position of the renewable within the energy mix and address the concerns of traditional              
utilities, state utilities not only do not have incentive to facilitate growth of renewables but               
also may act as a barrier.  
Although electricity reform legislation has been enacted in nearly all resource-rich MENA            
countries, institutions to implement them are lagging behind. Issues such as regulatory            
instability, lack of comprehensive legislation, inadequate operational standards for power          
30 For instance, ADWEC in UAE and Saudi Electricity Company in Saudi Arabia.  
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systems with intermittent renewables, incomplete regulatory frameworks for ancillary         
services, grid access, balancing rules and balancing responsibilities are concerns for           
investors in renewables facilities. The lack of regulatory independence is also a major             
impediment, as governments often overturn regulatory decisions and in many cases tariffs            
for procurement of renewables are set inflexibly. Finally, the lack of transparency and             
predictability in support schemes for renewable deployment highlight the extent of           
institutional challenges.  
Table 8: Institutions for Renewables Deployment 
 Electricity regulatory 
agency 
RE Policy Maker (Dedicated Agency/Department) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Electricity and 
Co-generation Regulatory 
Authority (ECRA) 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
(KACARE) 
Iran Ministry of Energy  Renewable Energy Organisation of Iran (SUNA) in 
collaboration with Ministry of Energy  
Kuwait None None 
UAE Abu Dhabi Regulation and 
Supervision Bureau 
Clean Energy and Climate Change Department at 
Ministry of Energy 
Algeria Commission de 
Régulation de l’Electricité 
et du Gaz (CREG) 
Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Directorate 
at the Ministry of Energy and Mines 
Qatar None Qatar General Water and Electricity Corporation 
(KAHRAMAA) 
Jordan Energy and Minerals 
Regulatory Commission 
Renewable Energy Department at the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources 
Morocco None Energy and Renewable Energies at the Ministry of 
Energy, Mines, Water and Environment; Agency for the 
Development of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Egypt Egyptian Electric Utility 
and Consumer Protection 
Regulatory Agency 
New and Renewable Energy Authority 
 
[Source: RCREEE/AFEX (2015); Authors] 
3.3 Risks and uncertainties 
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Economic environments for investors always contain risks and uncertainty and renewable           
energy industry is no exception. Renewable investors face a range of risks including political              
risk, policy and regulatory risks, technology, currency and liquidity risk, and power off-taker             
risk (IRENA, 2016b). These not only affect the path of technological evolution but more              
importantly the cost of capital with direct implications for renewable competiveness and            
addressing them require access to effective risk mitigation instruments.  
Political risks are related to political events which negatively impact the value of investment              
including war, civil disturbance, sabotage, expropriation and non-honouring of contracts.          
Policy and regulatory risks are related to changes in investment incentives (for example,             
removal of renewable subsidies), network codes, grid connection costs model, and           
permitting processes among others. In resource-rich MENA countries, renewable investors          
face uncertainty both where there is no specific renewable policy as well as after policy               
incentives are designed and implemented. Pre-implementation uncertainties include not         
knowing if, when, or what type of policy will be implemented to incentivise renewables.              
Post-implementation uncertainties are related to stability, transparency, trust and insurance          
for long-term support. Developers also face technology risk, related to nascent renewable            
technologies which lack a proven track record of operation in the MENA. The local              
workforce may lack the skills needed to operate and maintain power systems with             
renewable technologies. This risk becomes more pronounced knowing that a segment of the             
skilled workers in these economies tend to be expatriates. 
The currency risk pertains to the volatility of domestic currency value with respect to foreign               
currencies. This is particularly important as most renewable power producers’ costs are in             
hard currency (e.g., dollar or euro because of loans), whereas their revenue is in local               
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currency (e.g., feed in tariff paid in domestic currency). Local currency depreciation leads to              
a mismatch between cost and revenue and can negatively impact the financial health of              
renewable energy companies. In the GCC countries, traditionally, national currencies were           
pegged to the US dollar due high reliance on import thus exchange rate was considered less                
of an issue. However, with drop in oil price and consequently revenue, keeping the value of                
national currency fixed becomes increasing difficult for many of hydrocarbon countries.           
Furthermore, in countries such as Egypt – which offered higher feed-in-tariffs than many             
other countries in the region ($0.13/kWh) meaning that investors were willing to take on              
currency risks, the imposition of capital controls in 2015 meant that investors could not              
repatriate their profits, constituting a major disincentive to investment. In addition to the             
currency risk, renewable energy companies are exposed to the risk of insufficient liquidity if              
there is a mismatch between the time of revenue receipts and cost payments.  
Finally, the credit and/or default risk of the power off-taker is an important concern for               
renewable energy developers. This is especially exacerbated when the market structure is            
such that there is only one off-taker (e.g., public utility company) and power producers have               
no choice but to contract with the single buyer and bear the credit risk. In India, one of the                   
fastest-growing markets for solar power, some developers are hesitant to sign Power            
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with state-owned distribution utilities due to their low credit            
ratings. Around 40% of allocated projects have reportedly been delayed/cancelled over the            31
last two years. The evolution away from the current market models to structures that              32
diversify offtakers can eliminate counter-party risk. In some MENA countries (for example            
the GCC), considerable fiscal buffers at the time of high oil price implied that the government                
31 Developers are subject to a penalty or bid bond if they fail to follow through on projects after winning the                     
auction. Often, firms prefer to pay the penalty rather than entering into PPAs with state distribution utilities. 
32 See ‘India’s cutthroat solar auctions – behind the hype’, PV Tech, 22 December 2015.               
http://www.pv-tech.org/features/indias-cutthroat-solar-auctions-behind-the-hype 
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can ultimately indemnify the single buyer (state power company) but this may no longer exist               
with a prolonged low oil price. 
The premium on the cost of capital resulting from aforementioned risks can prevent             
renewable investors from entering the renewable energy industry altogether. Effective          
financial de-risk instruments provided by public financial institutions along with appropriate           
government policies are crucial to channel capital into the renewable industry. Some MENA             
countries have attempted to set up separate renewable energy funds to underwrite new             
projects – for instance, the UAE, Morocco and Jordan. Algeria’s renewable fund is financed              
through 1% of oil revenues allocated to it (RCREEE/AFEX, 2015). Such funds are under              
consideration in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait as well. However, given limited public             
finance, government guarantees are also an effective way of leveraging private capital.            
Guarantee instruments can cover many of the renewable energy investment risks and thus             
make them attractive to investors. Financial guarantees have long been used to back fossil              
fuel investment, but their use in the renewable energy industry remains limited because of              
financial institutions’ lack of experience in the renewables industry as well as low demand for               
these instruments (IRENA, 2016b).  
4. Power sector reform and renewable deployment 
The structure of the power sector directly affects the deployment of renewables as it is the                
platform upon which incentive mechanisms for renewables should be designed. In countries            
with non-liberalised power sectors, electricity services are provided through a vertically           
integrated monopoly (VIM) which owns and operate all elements across the supply chain:             
generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply. The state-owned monopoly plans          
for investments (and operation) of all installed facilities.  
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Although most MENA countries had vertically-integrated electricity sectors until the late           
1990s/early 2000s, legislation has led to the beginnings of a transition away from this model,               
but progress has been slow. The reform laws of Iran (1999), Saudi Arabia (2005) and Algeria                
(2002) envision wholesale markets; the UAE’s (Abu Dhabi) reform law (1998) envisages            
disaggregated single buyers with bilateral trading and third party access, whereas the reform             
laws of Kuwait (2008; 2010) and Qatar are limited to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in               
generation, and unbundling (for Qatar) (Dyllick-Brenzinger and Finger, 2013).  
Therefore, electricity markets in the region have different degrees of liberalisation, some of             
which are more suited to renewable deployment. In principle, based on the level of              
liberalisation, electricity market structures can be presented as five distinct models which            
range from a VIM to a fully competitive wholesale and retail electricity market. Figure 6               
presents these models and associated set of feasible renewable policy instruments that can             
be implemented under each market structure. The first structure after a VIM is the single               
buyer model. At this stage, the monopoly over generation is formally lifted and IPPs are               
allowed to enter the market and generate electricity. Therefore, as opposed to VIM where              
incentives for renewables deployment can only be given to the monopoly, private investors             
are incentivised under the single buyer model. Private investment enables the usage of             
tendering in addition to other support schemes under VIM.  
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 Figure 6: Models of electricity market structure and the range of feasible renewable 
support schemes at each stage 
[Source: Authors] 
The challenge of a bundled single buyer is that the coexistence of a huge integrated               
monopoly (single buyer or public utility) alongside private generators may hamper           
renewable advancement. Firstly, from an investment perspective, renewable penetration         
disrupts the business model of the incumbent monopoly, because the promotion of private             
renewable plants and on-site generation transfers assets away from the utility company to             
its consumers and private investors. Since utilities generate a return on the equity or assets               
they own, this is a direct threat to their earnings. Thus, provision of incentives to private                
investors and end-users for installation of renewables tends to not be supported by             
vertically integrated single buyers. Secondly, from an operational standpoint, the vertically           
integrated single buyer may prioritise its own generation assets for dispatching when            
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demand is weak. The inefficiency generated from this behaviour benefits the monopoly at             
the cost of smaller private generators and consumers.  
Therefore, in order to avoid the abuse of monopoly power, countries need to gradually              
move to the third model, which is an unbundled single buyer. In this step, generation is                
unbundled from transmission and distribution (T&D). The unbundling can initially be in the             
form of separating the monopoly’s accounts, but should at some point transition to full              
unbundling, or separation of ownership. In this way, the single buyer would be the grid               
company operating the transmission network (and distribution network if it is not            
separated) and does not own any generation asset. The grid company is subject to              
regulation for non-discriminatory grid access and cost efficiency improvement to alleviate           
monopoly power and remove perverse incentives.  
Apart from the efficiency issues with a monopsonistic market structure, transactions with a             
single buyer always include credit and default risk on the part of the off-taker. Multiple               
buyers in the market not only reduce this risk but can also improve efficiency. The buyers                
can be regional transmission companies, suppliers of electricity to the end-users and/or            
large electricity consumers. The grid operator can be an independent system operator (ISO)             
or the largest owner of the transmission network (if there are several transmission             
companies), in which case it is called the transmission system operator (TSO). In recent, the               
issue of security of supply and decarbonisation has led to emergence of hybrid market              
structure in which the market governed by limited competition and long-term contracts            
(Roques and Finon, 2017). Such market structure now exist in Latin America and some other               
countries that have retreated from full liberalisation. .  
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The fifth model includes fully competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets. The            
design of wholesale market varies in countries with liberalised power sectors, but typically             
includes a day-ahead market, a market for bilateral contracts, and a balancing market.             
Countries can adopt new schemes such as feed-in-premiums and TGCs in addition to             
instruments used in a non-liberalised electricity market. An advantage of new schemes is that              
the investor of a renewable facility needs to recover its costs partly through the market, and                
partly through direct subsidies, spreading costs between the government budget and the            
consumer. The disadvantage is that it exposes investors to market price volatility.  
Figure 7 depicts prevalent MENA power sector structures, which have two characteristics:            
first, they are all variants of the single buyer model, with the government retaining a               
dominant role. And second, the models differ on the level at which competition between              
economic actors is brought to bear (Dyllick-Brenzinger and Finger, 2013). Most countries            
have opted for auction-based competition in the tendering process for IPPs (or Integrated             
Water and Power Producers - IWPPs) in generation (the only segment with private actors)              
based on long-term Power Purchase Agreements. Iran is the only country where competition             
is introduced through bid-based auctions in the day-ahead and/or spot market for generation,             
with the purchase price of electricity for the single buyer in the pool determined by the                
interaction of competing generators.   33
33 The Iranian pool is said to resemble original electricity pool of England and Wales. 
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 Figure 7: MENA Power Sector Models 
[Source: Authors] 
The simultaneous operation of renewables and traditional generation within competitive          
wholesale markets can lead to market breakdown and a distortion of electricity price             
signals, especially when renewables have out-of-market payments. This is because          
electricity prices in liberalized wholesale markets are set according to the system marginal             
cos or short-term marginal cost of the last (and, following the merit order, most expensive)               
plant that is required to be brought onto the system in order to meet demand (Keay et al,                  
2013; Sen, 2014). Conversely, renewable generators have very high capital costs but almost             
zero marginal cost of operation potentially leading to a wholesale electricity price which             
does not perform its intended function - i.e., provide an incentive for investment and              
efficient operation. This is a major challenge in developed economies and shows the             
importance of designing electricity markets fit for renewables.  
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The tension between liberalisation and decarbonisation has arisen partly because          
renewables were imposed upon a market designed for conventional fossil fuel electricity.            
MENA countries, by contrast, have the opportunity to design their electricity markets            
around the incorporation of renewables at the outset and tap into years of experience              
gained through trial-and-error in advanced economies. These countries can adopt market           
structures that avoid issues related to the perverse incentives of integrated monopolies and             
counter-part risk of single buyer, and also the market breakdown under fully liberalised             
electricity systems. The hybrid market structure where short-term competition is combined           
with long-term contracts is proved to be the way forward for developing countries.  
 
5. Conclusions  
Despite enormous renewable energy potential in resource-rich MENA countries, their share           
in electricity generation is among the lowest in the world, lagging behind similar             
high-income and low-income economies. This paper contends that while the main obstacles            
to renewables deployment are institutional challenges, grid inadequacy and risk and           
uncertainties, the solutions for spurring investment lie on a policy instrument spectrum in             
which a full market-based approach and a full renewable subsidies model (in addition to              
existing fossil fuel subsides) are two polar cases. The market approach requires the             
complete removal of fossil fuel subsidies, whereas a renewable subsidies programme           
requires long-term support and commitment on the part of government. Furthermore, the            
market approach promotes competition in the energy sector and relies entirely on price             
signals, whereas a fully subsidised renewable program encourages investment by offering           
various forms of direct and indirect financial incentives. Implementing the market-oriented           
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approach is politically challenging given the political structure in these countries, while            
adopting a fully subsidised renewable programme is economically problematic given high           
fossil fuel subsides and tight fiscal budgets following the oil price decline.  
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the two dimensions across the policy instrument             
spectrum implying that the two polar solutions themselves are not easily and fully             
implementable. We propose a combinatorial approach in which incentive for investment is            
provided partially through the market and partially through government subsidies. The           
combinatorial approach can be part of a dynamic process where governments start from the              
most feasible point on the proposed policy instrument spectrum and gradually move            
towards market-based incentive provision over the medium to long-term where energy           
subsidies are eventually phased out. The dynamic combinatorial approach not only reduces            
fiscal pressure on government budgets (compared to a fully subsidised model), but also             
averts political risks by allowing businesses and households to slowly adapt to the new              
environment, where energy carriers are priced at their full economic costs. This approach is              
also compatible with the current partial energy price reforms in the region.  
Although the provision of investment incentives is necessary for renewable deployment           
they are insufficient on their own, as barriers to deployment need to be removed.              
Resource-rich countries need to ensure that the necessary institutional capacity exists to            
deliver renewables, generators have access to a reliable and flexible grid and ensure             
appropriate risk mitigation instruments are available to deal with inherent uncertainties.           
The presence of these barriers can led to underinvestment not just in renewables but also               
conventional generations that are essential to backup renewables.  
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The other important consideration is to reconcile market liberalisation with renewable           
integration. The experience of developed economies show that full market liberalisation           
does not go well with renewables deployment because of the impact that renewable             
integration has on the electricity price prices. The paper asserts that while many MENA              
economies have moved away from vertically integrated structures, most retain variants of            
the single-buyer model which in some cases is accompanied by the unbundling of             
generation and network segments. To avoid the perverse incentives seen in integrated            
monopolies and reduce credit and default risk posed by a single power off taker, an               
appropriate market structure needs to be adopted. The suitable market structure for the             
region is likely to be a hybrid one in which sport market and long-term contract co-exist and                 
at the same time power offtakers are diversified.  
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